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Abstract
The Government of Malawi has signed contracts called service level agreements (SLAs) with mission
health facilities in order to exempt their catchment populations from paying user fees. Government
in turn reimburses the facilities for the services that they provide. SLAs started in 2006 with 28 out of
165 mission health facilities and increased to 74 in 2015. Most SLAs cover only maternal, neonatal
and in some cases child health services due to limited resources. This study evaluated the effect of
user fee exemption on the utilization of maternal health services. The difference-in-differences ap-
proach was combined with propensity score matching to evaluate the causal effect of user fee ex-
emption. The gradual uptake of the policy provided a natural experiment with treated and control
health facilities. A second control group, patients seeking non-maternal health care at CHAM health
facilities with SLAs, was used to check the robustness of the results obtained using the primary con-
trol group. Health facility level panel data for 142 mission health facilities from 2003 to 2010 were
used. User fee exemption led to a 15% (P < 0.01) increase in the mean proportion of women who
made at least one antenatal care (ANC) visit during pregnancy, a 12% (P < 0.05) increase in average
ANC visits and an 11% (P< 0.05) increase in the mean proportion of pregnant women who delivered
at the facilities. No effects were found for the proportion of pregnant women who made the first ANC
visit in the first trimester and the proportion of women who made postpartum care visits. We con-
clude that user fee exemption is an important policy for increasing maternal health care utilization.
For certain maternal services, however, other determinants may be more important.
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Key Messages
• User fee exemption at mission health facilities in Malawi led to increases in the percentage of pregnant women who
made at least one antenatal care visit during pregnancy, average antenatal care visits and facility deliveries. No effects
were found for first antenatal care visits in the first trimester and postpartum care visits.
• User fee exemption is important for increasing maternal health care utilization but may not have the same importance
for different maternal health services. For maternal health services for which utilization was not responsive to the price
change, other determinants may need to be examined.
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Introduction
Since the late 1990s, many low and middle countries have abolished
user fees for health care or put in place exemption mechanisms in
order to expand access to health care. In Malawi, the Government
has intervened to exempt catchment populations of mission health
facilities from paying user fees since 2006. User fee exemption is im-
plemented through contracts between Government and Christian
Health Association of Malawi (CHAM) health facilities. These con-
tracts are called service level agreements (SLAs). Through SLAs,
CHAM health facilities exempt their catchment populations from
paying user fees and Government in turn reimburses them for the
services that they provide. The aim of SLAs is to expand access to a
basic package of health services known as the Essential Health
Package (EHP). The EHP consists of cost-effective interventions tar-
geting a limited number of diseases and conditions that rank highly
in terms of burden of disease (Ministry of Health 2002). The first
SLA was piloted in 2005. In 2006, SLAs were rolled out to 28 out of
165 CHAM health facilities and increased to 74 in 2015. Most SLAs
only cover maternal and neonatal services. Therefore, pregnant
women and neonates in the catchment areas of CHAM health facili-
ties with SLAs are exempted from paying user fees. This article asks
whether user fee exemption at CHAM health facilities with SLAs
has led to increased utilization of antenatal, delivery and postpartum
care at these facilities.
Research on the effects of user fee exemption on maternal health
care utilization has mostly demonstrated positive effects. User fee re-
moval has been shown to increase the use of maternal health care in
Uganda, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Kenya, Ghana, Burkina Faso,
Burundi and Nepal (Burnham et al. 2004; Deininger and Mpuga
2005; Penfold et al. 2007; Witter et al. 2010; De Allegri et al. 2011;
Meessen et al. 2011; Ridde and Morestin 2011; UNICEF, 2011;
Witter et al. 2011; World Health Organization, 2011; Powell-
Jackson and Hanson, 2012; Chama-Chiliba and Koch, 2014;
McKinnon et al. 2015). There are exceptions, however. In
Afghanistan, there was an increase in antenatal care (ANC) visits
immediately after user fee abolition but it was not sustained. There
was no effect on deliveries (Steinhardt et al. 2011). In South Africa,
user fee abolition was associated with a decline in ANC attendances
and new ANC registrations (Wilkinson et al. 2001).
The limitation of most of these studies is that they did not esti-
mate causal effects. This was either because nationwide implementa-
tion of user fee removal provided no scope for controls (e.g.
Burnham et al. 2004; Deininger and Mpuga 2005; Steinhardt et al.
2011) or, in the case of user fee exemptions, opportunities for creat-
ing control groups were not exploited (e.g. Wilkinson et al. 2001;
UNICEF 2011). So, in addition to the evidence not being unequivo-
cal, there is a limitation that the reported effects on utilization can-
not solely be attributed to user fee removal (Deininger and Mpuga
2005; Ministry of Health, 2010a; Khandker et al. 2010). Further,
many of the studies have reported increases in total attendances or
total new visits but have not controlled for population which may
have confounded the reported effects.
This article contributes to the literature on user fee removal as
follows. First, it evaluates the causal effect of a user fee exemption
policy implemented within the context of a pre-existing public-pri-
vate partnership between Government and CHAM. Government
and CHAM have had a mutually beneficial relationship where
Government relies on CHAM to provide health services in areas
where there are no Government health facilities and CHAM de-
pends on Government to provide personnel emoluments for its
human resources. About 80% of CHAM health facilities are located
in rural areas where the majority of the poor live (Aukerman 2006).
Government and CHAM also have a policy where Government can-
not build a health facility in the catchment area of a CHAM facility
and CHAM has to inform Government when taking on board a new
facility (Banda and Simukonda 1994). In all the countries studied in
this article, user fee removal was introduced in the public sector ex-
cept in Burundi where the policy was extended to faith-based pro-
viders but failed within a year due to late reimbursement of
providers by the Government (Nimpagaritse and Bertone 2011).
Second, this paper evaluates the effect of user fee exemption on the
proportion of women who used particular maternal health services,
hence controlling for any changes in utilization that were due to
population changes.
Background
Malawi is classified as a less developed country (World Bank 2015).
Typically, it has low Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. It
was estimated at US$274 in 2014 in constant 2005 US dollars trans-
lating into US$0.75 to spend per day for the average individual
(World Bank 2015). An ANC visit at US$6 and a normal delivery at
US$11 in the same year show the opportunity cost of using maternal
health care in terms of forgone consumption of other goods and ser-
vices (GIZ Health 2011).
The Malawi health care system consists of public, private-for-
profit and private not-for-profit providers. Health services in the
public sector are provided free-of-charge at the point of use while
private-for-profit and private not-for-profit providers charge user
fees. CHAM is a major not-for-profit provider, an umbrella organ-
ization of mission health care providers. In 2015, CHAM facilities
had a total catchment population of about 3.5 million out of a total
national population of 16.3 million. It is estimated that CHAM pro-
vides approximately up to 29% of all health care in Malawi
(Ministry of Health and ICF International 2014).
Government observed that user fees at CHAM health facilities
posed a barrier to accessing the EHP for a significant proportion of
the population. Therefore, the Ministry of Health in its Program of
Work (2004–10) introduced a policy of free access to the EHP by
every Malawian at the point of delivery. SLAs were an operationa-
lization of this policy in catchment areas of CHAM facilities. In
order to sign an SLA, a District Health Office (DHO) conducts a
needs assessment and then negotiates with the concerned CHAM
health facility services to be covered by the SLA and their prices.
Once the contract is signed, the DHO makes a publicity campaign
to make the catchment population of the CHAM health facility
aware of the free health services that become available under the
SLA. The health facility retrospectively bills the DHO on a monthly
basis based on the total quantity of health services utilized. The total
bill is the quantity of health services provided in a month multiplied
by fixed reimbursement rates agreed in the contract. SLAs are re-
newable yearly.
The causal effect of user fee exemption on maternal health care
utilization at CHAM health facilities is not known Ministry of
Health (2010a,b). SLAs were rolled out based on the results of a be-
fore and after comparison of utilization for the pilot SLA which
showed increased utilization. As was pointed out earlier, results
from before and after studies are unreliable. It is not possible to dis-
entangle the effects of user fee exemption from the effects of external
factors using this evaluation method (Deininger and Mpuga 2005;
Xu et al. 2006; Ministry of Health 2010a). For example, there may
be an improvement in the economic conditions of households at the
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same time that the policy is implemented. So the increase in uti-
lization may be due to both the exemption policy and the increased
ability to pay for health care by households (Khandker et al., 2010).
Before and after studies report the sum of both effects. Lack of evi-
dence on the impact of user fee exemption implies that the Ministry
of Health has no objective basis for expanding SLAs to more
CHAM health facilities. This study addresses this evidence gap.
Since user fee exemption is equivalent to a reduction in price, we
hypothesize that it will lead to increased utilization of maternal
health services.
Methods
Ideally, the effect of user fee exemption on health care utilization
should be the difference between the level of utilization at a
health facility in the presence of user fee exemption and the level of
utilization in the absence of user exemption. If y is a measure of uti-
lization, superscript 1 denotes treatment (user fee exemption) and
superscript 0 denotes no treatment (no user fee exemption), then the
effect of user fee exemption for health facility i at time t can be
measured as y1it  y0it. The average impact of the policy for health
facilities implementing user fee exemption will be
c ¼ Eðy1it  y0itjd ¼ 1Þ (1)
where d ¼ 1 denotes health facility with user fee exemption and
d ¼ 0 denotes health facility with no user fee exemption. The prob-
lem, however, is that y0it is never observed because the health facility
can only be in one state at a time. Different evaluation methods im-
plicitly provide alternatives to estimating the counterfactual, y0it
(Blundell and Costa Dias 2000). This study uses the difference-in-
differences (DiD) method which estimates the counterfactual out-
come as the sum of the mean of the outcome for the treatment group
before the policy and the mean gain in the outcome for the control
group before and after treatment. c is therefore expressed as follows
where t ¼ 0 before the policy and t ¼ 1 after the policy (Blundell
and Costa Dias 2007)
c ¼ E yitjd ¼ 1; t ¼ 1ð Þ
 E yitjd ¼ 1; t ¼ 0ð Þ þ E yitjd ¼ 0; t ¼ 1ð Þ  E yitjd ¼ 0; t ¼ 0ð Þ½ 
(2)
A key DiD assumption is that outcomes in both the treatment
and control groups have a parallel trend in the absence of the policy
(Blundell and Macurdy 1999; Chaudhury and Parajuli 2010). We
tested this assumption in two ways. First, we visually inspected util-
ization trends for SLA and non-SLA health facilities. Second, we fol-
lowed an approach by Autor (2003) which involves estimating
regressions with interacted terms of treatment and time variables be-
fore and after treatment. The pre-treatment interactions are then
tested for statistical significance. If they are not significant, then the
null hypothesis of no difference in the trends for the treatment and
control groups cannot be rejected. We also used a second control
group, patients seeking all other non-maternal health care at SLA
CHAM health facilities, to check the robustness of the results ob-
tained using the first control group. The second control group and
treatment group would experience the same shocks for coming from
the same catchment area, thus nullifying the need to invoke the com-
mon trends assumption. Using the second control group also helped
circumvent the potential problem of endogeneity i.e. correlation of
the policy variable with the error term which arises as a result of the
policy targeting health facilities with low utilization and leads to in-
consistent estimates (Wooldridge 2010).
To ensure that the treatment and control groups were compar-
able in terms of initial characteristics, treatment and control health
facilities were matched on their propensity scores and then DiD esti-
mation was conducted. Propensity score matching was only imple-
mented for the models which used the first control group because
the second group shared the same characteristics with the treatment
group, the data being at facility level. Propensity scores were ob-
tained by estimating the following probit equation for each year of
the data
Pr SLAi ¼ 1jXð Þ ¼ A hcfdþ b1hwþ b2cpopnð Þ (3)
Equation (3) estimates the probability of health facility i partici-
pating in an SLA as a function of a vector of health facility types
(‘hcf’) (i.e. whether it was a health centre, a community hospital or a
secondary hospital), the number of health workers at the health fa-
cility (‘hw’) and catchment population (‘cpopn’). Að:Þ is the cumula-
tive normal density function. From equation (3), the propensity
scores of participating in an SLA, dPrðXÞ, were estimated for each
health facility for every year. Balancing tests were conducted until
there were no statistically significant differences in the means of the
explanatory variables between the treatment and control groups.
DiD was combined with propensity score matching by weighting re-
gressions with weights obtained from the propensity scores. The
caliper technique was used to estimate the weights (Khandker et al.
2010). For treated units the weight was 1 while for control units the
weight was expressed as dPrðXÞ= 1  dPrðXÞh i (Khandker et al. 2010).
The following unobserved effects regression model was used
lnðyitÞ ¼ ht þ cSLAit þ vi þ eit (4)
In equation (4), lnðyitÞ is the natural log of a measure of utiliza-
tion for health facility i in year t. h is a vector of all year dummy
variables included to fully control for time trends. SLAit is the policy
dummy variable, which took the value of 1 if health facility i had
user fee exemption in year t and 0 otherwise. c is the coefficient of
the policy dummy and estimates the average treatment effect on the
treated as expressed in equation (2). It is the mean difference in
lnðyitÞ between the treatment and control groups before and after
the introduction of user fee exemption. vi is a time invariant health
facility unobserved effect. It may capture management quality or
any other facility or catchment area characteristics that affect the
provision of health services but remain constant over time
(Wooldridge 2010). eit is an idiosyncratic error term. Only observa-
tions that were in the region of common support in the propensity
score matching were used in the estimation of equation (4).
The fixed effects model was used to estimate equation (4). It
eliminates the unobserved effect and hence produces consistent esti-
mates even when the unobserved effect is arbitrarily correlated with
explanatory variables (Heckman et al. 1999; Todd 2007;
Wooldridge 2010). We used a fully robust variance-covariance ma-
trix estimator to produce consistent estimates in light of potential
serial correlation (Wooldridge 2010). Estimation was conducted
using Stata 12 and the program psmatch2 by Leuven and Sianesi
(2003) was used for propensity score matching.
Data
Yearly panel data on maternal health care utilization at CHAM
health facilities were used. They were obtained from the health man-
agement information system (HMIS) of the Ministry of Health. The
data covered an 8-year period, 2003–10, for up to 142 CHAM
health facilities per year. The number of SLA and non-SLA facilities
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by facility type and year are shown in Table 1. The intention was to
use data for the total number of CHAM health facilities in every
year, 161 in 2003 increasing to 172 in 2010 (JICA 2003; CHAM
2014). However, not all health facilities reported data every year.
This is shown in Table 1 by the fluctuation in the total number of
health facilities in the sample over time.
In addition to the health facilities not reporting their data for all
years, not every health facility reported data for all 12 months of the
year. The average number of months reported per year though was
11 for all variables for the whole sample. In fact, at least 65% of ob-
servations for all utilization variables were based on 12 months’ re-
porting and at least 80% on not <9 months’ reporting for the whole
sample. SLA facilities had a higher mean reporting rate in months
per year than non-SLA facilities by about a month. This is shown in
Table A.1 in Supplementary Appendix A. It is possible that the re-
quirement to send monthly bills to the DHO with sufficient evidence
of services provided positively influenced reporting of HMIS data to
the Ministry of Health headquarters. Summary statistics for all vari-
ables used in this study are provided in Table 2, disaggregated by
SLA status. The maternal health care utilization variables in Table 2
are defined as follows:
1. Proportion of pregnant women who made the first ANC visit in
first trimester: yearly total of pregnant women who made their
first antenatal visit at a health facility within the first 3 months
of pregnancy divided by the estimated number of pregnant
women in the catchment area of the facility.
2. Proportion of pregnant women who made at least one ANC visit
during pregnancy: yearly total number of pregnant women who
made at least one ANC visit at a health facility during pregnancy
divided by the estimated number of pregnant women in the
catchment area.
3. Average ANC visits: the total number of ANC visits at a health
facility in a year divided by the estimated population of pregnant
women in the catchment area.
4. Proportion of health facility deliveries: the total number of deliv-
eries at a health facility in a year divided by the estimated num-
ber of pregnant women in the catchment area.
5. Proportion of women who made postpartum care visits 2 weeks
after delivery: the yearly total number of women who made at
least one postpartum care visit 2 weeks after delivery at a health
facility divided by the estimated number of pregnant women in
the catchment area. The two week period is recommended by
the Ministry of Health (Ministry of Health 2003).
The five variables capture different dimensions of the maternal
health care process. The proportion of women who made the first
ANC visit in the first trimester measures the extent of early ANC
seeking. The proportion of women who made at least one ANC visit
during pregnancy is self-explanatory. Average ANC visits portray
the extent to which pregnant women are followed up during preg-
nancy, holding other factors constant. ANC visits are expected to
culminate in facility deliveries and the maternal health care process
is completed by postpartum care. The ANC variables are also per-
formance indicators for the focussed ANC (FANC) approach (see
Villar et al. 2001). The FANC approach recommends that pregnant
women who have no complications make four ANC visits at specific
times during pregnancy. The first visit should ideally occur before
12 weeks (first trimester) but not later than 16 weeks of pregnancy.
Table 1. Number of mission health facilities in the sample by SLA
status, facility type and year
Year
Whether facility
has SLA
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
No Health Centre 96 87 96 88 73 67 67 64
Community
Hospital
27 25 27 19 16 14 13 10
Hospital 14 15 15 4 3 2 1 1
Sub-total 137 127 138 111 92 83 81 75
Yes Health Centre 9 25 31 32 35
Community
Hospital
8 12 14 15 18
Hospital 11 12 14 14 14
Sub-total 28 49 59 61 67
Grand total 137 127 138 139 141 142 142 142
Table 2. Summary statistics by SLA status for the period 2003–10
SLA No SLA Difference
N Mean SD N Mean SD Mean p-value
Proportion of pregnant women who made:
First ANC visits in first trimester 262 0.08 0.10 795 0.07 0.10 0.01* 0.059
At least one ANC visit during pregnancy 264 0.96 0.54 805 0.82 0.59 0.14*** 0.001
Facility deliveries 264 0.62 0.35 788 0.44 0.30 0.18*** 0.000
Postpartum care visits 252 0.28 0.22 518 0.26 0.21 0.02 0.246
Average ANC visits 264 2.34 1.38 807 2.25 1.54 0.09 0.357
Health workers per facility 261 23.5 26.2 772 7.8 12.7 15.7*** 0.000
Facility catchment population 264 37993 34688 844 20462 18347 17531*** 0.000
Health facility type
Health centre 264 0.50 0.50 844 0.76 0.43 0.26*** 0.000
Community hospital 264 0.25 0.44 844 0.18 0.38 0.07** 0.013
Secondary hospital 264 0.25 0.43 844 0.07 0.25 0.18*** 0.000
*P< 0.10; ** P< 0.05; ***P< 0.01.
N represents the total number of observations for all health facility panels. SD, standard deviation.
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More visits are recommended for women who have complications
or special needs (Ministry of Health 2003; National Statistical
Office and ICF Macro 2011).
Table 2 shows that the means of the utilization variables were
lower in the control group and their differences between the SLA
and non-SLA groups were statistically significant except for average
ANC visits and the proportion of women who made postpartum
care visits. The mean values of the number of health workers per
health facility and catchment population were higher in the SLA
group because it had more community and secondary hospitals.
Results
Utilization trends by SLA status are shown in Figure 1. The trends
were generally parallel up to 2006. This was confirmed by signifi-
cance tests of coefficients of pre-policy treatment and time inter-
actions. The tests failed to reject the null hypothesis of no difference
in the trends for all variables except ln(Prop. Postpartum care visits).
The test was not conducted for the variable ln(Prop. Postpartum
care visits) because it did not have adequate pre-policy data. The re-
sults are reported in Supplementary Appendix B. We therefore con-
cluded that the common trends assumption was satisfied.
Propensity score matching eliminated bias in all the variables ex-
cept one category of the health facility type variable i.e. there were
no statistically significant differences in the means of the variables
by SLA status after matching except for the one category of the facil-
ity type variable. We were satisfied with the matching results and
did not want to pursue achieving balance for the one health facility
type category at the expense of the sample in the region of common
support. The results are reported in Supplementary Appendix C. We
then estimated equation (4) for all five maternal health care
utilization variables, applying weights derived from the matching re-
sults. Two sets of results are presented. The primary set of results re-
lates to models in which the control group was pregnant women at
CHAM health facilities with no SLAs. The second set of results re-
lates to models in which patients who used non-maternal health care
at CHAM health facilities with SLAs were the control group.
Because the dependent variables were log-transformed, the formula
%Dy ¼ 100  ½expðbbDxÞ  1 is used to interpret the coefficient of
the SLA dummy variable in relation to the dependent variable [%Dy
is the percentage change in the dependent variable, exp denotes ex-
ponent, bb is the estimated coefficient and Dx is the change in the
regressor (Wooldridge 2009)].
Control group is pregnant women at non-SLA CHAM
health facilities
Table 3 shows results for all the five utilization variables when preg-
nant women at non-SLA CHAM health facilities were the control
group. Data for postpartum care visits were only available from
2005. In model (i), user fee exemption had no effect on the propor-
tion of pregnant women who made first ANC visit in the first tri-
mester. In model (ii), the coefficient on the SLA dummy shows that
the mean proportion of women who made at least one ANC visits
during pregnancy increased by 15% (95% CI: 8%, 24%) (P<0.01)
due to user fee exemption. The baseline mean proportion of women
who made at least one ANC visit during pregnancy for SLA CHAM
health facilities before user fee exemption started was estimated to
be 0.729. Therefore, the 15% increase means this proportion rose to
0.838 due to user fee exemption. In model (iii), the coefficient on the
SLA dummy shows that user fee exemption led to a 12% (95% CI:
0.70%, 25%) (P<0.05) increase in average ANC visits. The base-
line number of average ANC visits was 2.31 for SLA CHAM health
Figure 1: Utilization trends by SLA status.
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facilities. A 12% increase means that average visits rose to 2.59 due
to user fee exemption. In model (iv), user fee exemption led to an
11% (95% CI: 1%, 21%) (P<0.05) increase in the mean propor-
tion of facility deliveries. The pre-policy mean utilization rate for
deliveries was 0.44. The 11% increase therefore implies that the
mean proportion of facility deliveries rose from 0.44 to 0.49 due to
user fee exemption. Finally, in model (v), user fee exemption had no
effect on the proportion of women who made postpartum care visits
2 weeks after delivery.
Control group is patients seeking non-maternal health
care at CHAM health facilities with SLAs
Table 4 shows the results of the DiD analysis that used patients who
sought non-maternal health care at CHAM health facilities with SLAs
as the control group. Data for postpartum care visits were only avail-
able from 2004. User fee exemption had no effect on the proportion
of women who made first ANC visits in the first trimester just as in
Table 3. In model (ii), user fee exemption led to a 15% (95% CI: 4%,
28%) (P<0.01) increase in the mean proportion of women who
made at least one ANC visit during pregnancy. In model (iii), user fee
exemption led to an 11% (95% CI: 0.30%, 25%) (P < 0.10) increase
in average ANC visits. The mean proportion of women who delivered
at CHAM health facilities with SLAs increased by 15% (95% CI:
4%, 26%) (P < 0.01) in model (iv). In model (v), user fee exemption
had no effect on the proportion of women who made postpartum care
visits 2 weeks after delivery. The results in Table 4 were consistent
with those in Table 3. The same utilization variables had statistically
significant coefficients for the SLA variable in both tables and the
point estimates and CIs were similar.
Discussion
The results reported here support the hypothesis that user fee ex-
emption will lead to increased utilization of maternal health care.
They also corroborate findings of the majority of evaluations that
have shown increased utilization of health care after user fee re-
moval (see Lagarde and Palmer 2011; Dzakpasu et al. 2014). They
Table 3. Fixed effects regressions when the control group was pregnant women at mission health facilities without SLAs
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
ln(Prop. First ANC
visits in first trimester)
ln(Prop. at least one
ANC visit during pregnancy)
ln(Average
ANC visits)
ln(Prop.
deliveries)
ln(Prop. Postpartum
care visits)
SLA 0.074 (0.088) 0.149*** (0.035) 0.116** (0.055) 0.105** (0.044) 0.004 (0.094)
Year (Base ¼ 2003)
2004 0.460** (0.184) 0.597*** (0.063) 0.839*** (0.076) 0.630*** (0.068)
2005 0.064 (0.229) 0.176*** (0.055) 0.374*** (0.087) 0.127* (0.075) (Base ¼ 2005)
2006 0.283 (0.201) 0.096 (0.078) 0.527*** (0.086) 0.165** (0.072) 0.423*** (0.108)
2007 0.402*** (0.088) 0.154** (0.061) 0.480*** (0.072) 0.071 (0.072) 0.255*** (0.077)
2008 0.044 (0.079) 0.143** (0.056) 0.481*** (0.065) 0.070 (0.068) 0.035 (0.161)
2009 0.125 (0.110) 0.205** (0.081) 0.527*** (0.118) 0.146 (0.103) 0.091 (0.146)
2010 0.042 (0.114) 0.194*** (0.070) 0.656*** (0.114) 0.024 (0.078) 0.113 (0.106)
Constant 0.264*** (0.056) 0.189*** (0.054) 0.490*** (0.058) 0.155*** (0.054) 0.188*** (0.065)
N 748 758 760 744 533
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.238 0.213 0.282 0.085
Standard errors in parentheses.
*P< 0.10; **P< 0.05; ***P< 0.01.
Table 4. Fixed effects regressions when the control group was patients seeking non-maternal health care at mission health facilities with
SLAs
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
ln(Prop. First ANC
visits in first trimester)
ln(Prop. at least one
ANC visit during pregnancy)
ln(Average
ANC visits)
ln(Prop.
Deliveries)
ln(Prop. Postpartum
care visits)
SLA 0.091 (0.104) 0.142*** (0.053) 0.108* (0.056) 0.136*** (0.050) 0.045 (0.099)
Year (Base ¼ 2003)
2004 0.738*** (0.129) 0.500*** (0.124) 0.684*** (0.130) 0.487*** (0.061) (Base ¼ 2004)
2005 0.330** (0.145) 0.029 (0.119) 0.187 (0.124) 0.040 (0.050) 0.603*** (0.096)
2006 0.237 (0.152) 0.082 (0.116) 0.139 (0.124) 0.071 (0.056) 0.661*** (0.108)
2007 0.314* (0.178) 0.128 (0.122) 0.356*** (0.131) 0.112 (0.069) 0.529*** (0.118)
2008 0.143 (0.183) 0.160 (0.121) 0.062 (0.128) 0.191*** (0.068) 0.777*** 0.125)
2009 0.261 (0.181) 0.166 (0.124) 0.097 0.140) 0.237*** (0.073) 0.937*** (0.138)
2010 0.206 (0.197) 0.130 (0.129) 0.199 (0.145) 0.279*** (0.081) 1.039*** (0.138)
Constant 3.869*** (0.127) 2.425*** (0.106) 1.674*** (0.115) 2.711*** (0.045) 3.560*** (0.085)
N 973 981 981 980 840
Adjusted R2 0.204 0.235 0.150 0.324 0.144
Standard errors in parentheses.
*P< 0.10; **P< 0.05;*** P< 0.01.
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underscore the importance of user fee exemption as a strategy for
universal health coverage. An important implication of the results is
that user fee exemption may not have the same importance for dif-
ferent types of maternal health services. This is inferred from the
lack of significant effects for some variables and the significant posi-
tive effects for the other variables. The fact that the signs and statis-
tical significance of the SLA coefficients were the same for
corresponding utilization variables in the two sets of results shows
the robustness of the primary set of results. This section discusses
the results for each of the utilization variables starting with the ones
that had statistically significant effects.
The percentage of pregnant women who make at least one ANC
visit during pregnancy has been high in Malawi. The Malawi
Demographic and Health Survey (MDHS) (2004) showed that it
was 95% nationally while the MDHS (2010) showed that it rose to
99% (National Statistical Office and ORC Macro, 2005; National
Statistical Office and ICF Macro 2011). The data used in this study
showed that, for CHAM health facilities with user fee exemption, it
was 73% between 2003 and 2005 (before user fee exemption was
introduced) and increased to 84% due to user fee exemption.
However, despite the effect of user fee exemption it still fell below
the national average. For average ANC visits, the increase due to
user fee exemption means that pregnant women were modestly bet-
ter followed up at CHAM health facilities with SLAs, holding other
factors constant. Nevertheless, even after user fee exemption, the
average number of ANC visits was lower than the four visits recom-
mended in the FANC approach. This could partially be attributed to
what has been referred to as confidence selection where women who
have had previous uneventful pregnancies consider themselves to be
at low risk of complications and make fewer visits despite removal
of the financial barrier (Grossman and Joyce 1990).
Increase in the proportion of health facility deliveries due to user
fee exemption was an important achievement in a context where de-
livery at a health facility is a prerequisite for skilled birth attendance.
Skilled birth attendance is regarded as an important strategy for
reducing maternal mortality and morbidity (AbouZahr 1998;
Ronsmans and Graham 2006). The increase would be expected to
lead to a decline in the use of substitute providers such as traditional
birth attendants and private clinics. Due to data limitations, we
could not test this hypothesis. Other studies, though, support this
prediction. Ansah et al. (2009) using a randomized controlled trial
design and Powell-Jackson and Hanson (2012) using matching
methods showed how user fee exemption caused patients to shift
from alternative, mostly informal, health care providers to health
facilities that had removed user fees in Ghana and Nepal respect-
ively. In Kenya, Mwabu et al. (1995) showed that user fee exemp-
tion in the public health sector was associated with a decrease in the
use of private care. On the contrary, Xu et al. (2006) found that
after user fee abolition in Uganda, health care utilization increased
at both public and private health facilities for both the rich and
poor. They did not estimate causal effects, however.
A possible explanation why user fee exemption had no effect on
first ANC visits in the first trimester may be inferred from the na-
tional percentage of pregnant women who make the first ANC visit
in the first trimester. Demographic and Health Surveys for the years
2000, 2004 and 2010 found that only 7, 8 and 12.4% of pregnant
women, respectively, had a first ANC visit in the first trimester
(National Statistical Office and ORC Macro 2001, 2005; National
Statistical Office and ICF Macro 2011). A study conducted in the
catchment area of a Government health centre showed that only
11% of pregnant women registered for their first visit in the first tri-
mester despite services being free (Mvula-Mgawadere 2009). It can
be concluded therefore that this maternal health service was not re-
sponsive to price change. The implication of this is that there are
other perhaps more important determinants of first ANC visits in
the first trimester than price. In the African context, these determin-
ants include cultural norms, quality of care and health worker atti-
tudes (Myer and Harrison 2003; Mvula-Mgawadere 2009; Ndidi
and Oseremen 2010; Gross et al. 2012). Cultural beliefs are espe-
cially important for first ANC visits in the first trimester. Studies
have shown that there is a common cultural belief of disclosing preg-
nancy late, which has a negative effect on the timing of the first
ANC visit (Myer and Harrison 2003; Gross et al. 2012). Increasing
first ANC visits in the first trimester may therefore require address-
ing such determinants in addition to user fee exemption.
A possible reason user fee exemption had no statistically signifi-
cant effect on postpartum care could be that women who delivered
without complications were less likely to return for check-up. The
2009/10 HMIS report showed that only 28% of women who de-
livered at Government and CHAM health facilities returned for a
postpartum check-up 2 weeks after delivery. The percentage of preg-
nancies that had complications at these health facilities during the
same period was 15% (Ministry of Health 2010b). Assuming that
each woman who had a complication made one postpartum care
visit, then the percentage of women who had no complications but
made a postpartum visit 2 weeks after delivery declines significantly.
This implies that in order to make an impact on postpartum visits 2
weeks after delivery, there is need to focus more on other
determinants.
It would be expected that the estimates of the effects of user fee
exemption in the second set of results, where patients who sought
non-maternal health care at CHAM health facilities with SLAs were
the control group, would be smaller than those in the first set.
Income effects working at household level would diminish the gain
in the treatment group over the control group. This is because user
fee exemption increases the income available to households to spend
on other goods and services including non-maternal health care.
This argument, though, relies on the assumption that income in the
household is pooled and distributed to all members (see Samuelson
1956). Alternatively, there may be positive spill-over effects if other
household members see the benefits of health care through the ex-
empted groups or seize the opportunity of taking pregnant mothers
or neonates to health facilities to seek health care themselves
(Lagarde et al. 2012). The closeness of the estimates in the two sets
of results probably indicates that the extra income afforded by user
fee exemption was either not pooled and distributed or household
members allocated it to other goods and services than health care
and there were negligible or no spill-over effects.
Although this study was not an evaluation of the implementation
process of user fee exemption, it is worth bearing in mind SLA im-
plementation challenges in the interpretation of the results. An as-
sessment of SLA implementation by the Ministry of Health in 2009
found that there were delays in payments by DHOs which affected
implementation of the user fee exemption policy, inadequate staffing
levels and equipment at CHAM health facilities which rationed de-
mand and allegations that CHAM facilities were upcoding or inflat-
ing utilization in order to fraudulently gain additional revenue
(Ministry of Health 2009; Bradley et al. 2015).
Based on the results of this article, it is recommended that meas-
ures be put in place to ensure that free maternal health care and in-
deed the entire EHP is available to all populations that face user
fees. This would be consistent with broader Government policy of
free health care at the point of use for all Malawians. It is also im-
portant to heighten focus on non-price determinants of maternal
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health care use (Mazalale et al. 2015). This article acknowledges the
efforts that the Ministry of Health and other agents have taken
through the road map for accelerating the reduction of maternal
mortality and morbidity.
The study had limitations. First, data were limited in terms of
both quality and variables. Data recording and reporting problems
are still inevitable in the Malawi health care system and perhaps
more so at CHAM health facilities. Despite the general reporting
challenges at CHAM health facilities, SLA facilities had slightly bet-
ter reporting than non-SLA facilities and this could have biased the
reported effects. We also could not model the influence of important
demand factors such as socioeconomic status and education on util-
ization because the HMIS does not collect individual level data. This
too could have affected the results. Second, the DiD approach does
not control for time-variant unobserved characteristics. If there were
any such health facility characteristics which affected utilization,
these may have biased the results. Third, this study did not model
supply side capacity constraints at CHAM health facilities which
may have affected utilization. Fourth, it is likely that increased util-
ization of maternal health care compromised quality. This study did
not explore that dimension.
Conclusion
User fee exemption at CHAM health facilities with SLAs led to an
increase in the proportion of pregnant women who made at least
one ANC visit during pregnancy, average ANC visits and deliveries
while it had no effect on first ANC visits in the first trimester and
postpartum care visits. This implies that, while user fee exemption is
an important strategy for increasing maternal health care utilization,
it may not have the same importance for different maternal health
services. We therefore recommend that user fee exemption be ex-
panded to more eligible CHAM health facilities to increase utiliza-
tion of the price-elastic services while the effects of other
determinants such as cultural norms, risk attitudes, quality of mater-
nal health care and health worker attitudes should be evaluated for
the services for which utilization was not responsive to price change.
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